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Abstract
We study a large data set of stock portfolios held by individuals and organizations in the
Swedish stock market. The dividend yields on these portfolios are systematically related
to investors’ relative tax preferences for dividends versus capital gains. Tax-neutral in-
vestors earn 40 basis points higher dividend yield on their portfolios than investors that
face higher eﬀective taxation of dividends than capital gains. We conclude that there
are dividend tax clienteles in the market. We also argue that the abundant portfolio
holdings by private corporations, despite triple taxation at a combined marginal tax
rate as high as 77.5%, is a consequence of taxation.
Keywords: Tax incidence, dividend tax clienteles, capital gains tax, stock ownership.
JEL Classiﬁcation Numbers: G11, G35.
∗We are grateful for institutional information from Ingrid Eriksson, Kerstin Nilsson, Viveca Scherman Johans-
son, and Per Swanstr¨ om of Skatteverket, Kristina Melz´ en, Marie Rosvall of F¨ ors¨ akringsf¨ oreningen, Lina Sj¨ ostr¨ om,
Krister Swaretz, and Stig Westman of F¨ oreningssparbanken, Vigg Troedsson of Sveriges Fondhandlarf¨ orening, Jan
Bjuvberg, H˚ akan Thorsell, and Filip Wijkstr¨ om of the Stockholm School of Economics, Svante Johansson of Carnegie
Investment Bank, Johnny Larsson of Statistics Sweden, Roger Pettersson of RPA F¨ ors¨ akringsm¨ akleri, Sune Rydqvist
of Conﬁgura, Ingmarie Severien of Handelsbankens forskningsstiftelser, and Bo Winnerfeldt of the Nordic Central
Securities Depository. We also want to thank for comments by Michael Brennan and William Goetzman and by sem-
inar participants at Binghamton University, Frontiers of Investments in Curacao 2007, Helsinki School of Economics,
Ministry of Finance, New University of Lisbon, Norwegian School of Economics, Norwegian School of Management,
Ohio State University, Renselaer Polytechnic Institute, Royal Institute of Technology, Swedish Institute for Financial
Research, University of Maastricht, and University of Oxford. Financial support from the Bank of Sweden Tercente-
nary Foundation, and Johan och Jakob S¨ oderbergs stiftelse is gratefully acknowledged. Dahlquist: Swedish Institute
for Financial Research, Stockholm School of Economics and CEPR; e-mail magnus.dahlquist@sifr.org. Robertsson:
Swedish Institute for Financial Research; e-mail goran.robertsson@sifr.org. Rydqvist: Binghamton University and
CEPR; e-mail: rydqvist@binghamton.edu.1 Introduction
Corporations pay dividends and investors pay taxes on these dividends. Investors also pay taxes
on capital gains when they sell their shares, but they can choose when to do so. Some investors
are tax neutral, while other pay taxes on dividends but not on capital gains. Theory suggests
that investors can reduce the overall tax bill by sorting themselves into clienteles in which low-
tax investors collect the dividends and high-tax investors realize capital gains.1 Understanding
how the diﬀerential taxation of dividends and capital gains inﬂuences investors’ stock portfolios
has implications for the pricing of ﬁnancial securities, for corporations issuing securities, and for
governments collecting taxes.
There is a large literature that examines the tax clientele hypothesis with indirect measures.
One strand of the literature examines the price and volume patterns around the ex-dividend day.
Elton and Gruber (1970) argue that the patterns of ex-dividend day returns are consistent with
tax clienteles in the stock market, while Kalay (1982) and Boyd and Jagannathan (1994) challenge
this interpretation.2 A second strand relates stock returns and dividend yields. A return premium
on high-yield stocks would induce low-tax investors to hold high-yield stocks and high-tax investors
to hold low-yield stocks. Several studies run cross-sectional regressions of returns on dividend
yields, but reach diﬀerent conclusions (see, for example, Black and Scholes (1974), Litzenberger
and Ramaswamy (1979), Miller and Scholes (1982)). A third strand of the literature examines in-
stitutional ownership. Del Guercio (1996) and Grinstein and Michaely (2005) ﬁnd that institutions
prefer dividend-paying stocks, and Michaely, Thaler, and Womack (1995) and Dhaliwal, Erickson,
and Trezevant (1999) document changes in institutional ownership around dividend initiations and
omissions. These studies are often inconclusive on tax eﬀects because the tax status of institutional
investors cannot be determined.
There are also direct tests of the tax clientele hypothesis. Lewellen, Stanley, Lease, and Schlar-
1See, for example, Miller and Modigliani (1961), Brennan (1970), Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979), and Allen,
Bernardo, and Welch (2000).
2The core of the critique is that investors with diﬀerent marginal tax rates trade around the ex-dividend day until
prices reﬂect transaction costs rather than tax rates. Trading would mitigate the need for forming tax clienteles, but
the evidence suggests that relatively small amounts of stocks are traded, usually much less than 1% of the stock (see,
for instance, Michaely and Vila (1996)).
2baum (1977) and Pettit (1977) study the stock portfolios of 2,500 individual investors from a retail
brokerage house. Both studies relate dividend yields to proxies for marginal tax rates, but reach
opposite conclusions. Scholz (1992) looks at self-reported data by 4,000 individuals in the Survey
of Consumer Finances and ﬁnds evidence consistent with dividend tax clienteles. Most recently,
Graham and Kumar (2006) report that high-age, low-income individuals invest more in high-yield
stocks using a data set of 60,000 individual investors. These studies suﬀer from two weaknesses:
Data include small subsets of individuals and no organizations, which own most shares, and the
marginal tax rate of individuals is diﬃcult to estimate.
We study the tax clientele hypothesis using stock ownership data from Sweden. The data
set is comprehensive; it includes more than 34,000 stock portfolios held by organizations and two
million stock portfolios by individuals. The tax structure is ideal for estimating tax clientele
eﬀects: Tax rates are ﬂat and variation across investors arises mainly from variation in the taxation
of organizations. There are three tax clienteles in the Swedish stock market. First, individuals
are taxed at the 30% rate and businesses at the 28% rate. These investors prefer capital gains
over dividends because tax on capital gains can be postponed. Second, many organizations are
tax neutral. Relative to individuals and businesses, tax-neutral investors prefer dividends. Third,
the taxation of investment funds is asymmetric: Dividends pass through and are taxed by the
recipient, while capital gains accrue tax free within the fund. This means that investment funds
have a stronger preference for capital gains over dividends than any of the other investors. In this
tax environment we provide the following main results:
• Tax-neutral investors earn higher dividend yields on their portfolios than businesses, individ-
uals, and investment funds. The diﬀerence is large; tax-neutral investors earn 40 basis points
higher dividend yield on their portfolios than investment funds.
• More than 28,000 stock portfolios are held by corporations despite that income on such
portfolios is subject to triple taxation. We argue that the existence of these portfolios is a
consequence of taxation.
We conclude that there are dividend tax clienteles in the Swedish stock market. This result is not a
priori obvious. Shareholders trade oﬀ taxes against diversiﬁcation, and a plausible null hypothesis
3is that the beneﬁts of portfolio diversiﬁcation swamp the beneﬁts from reducing the tax bill.3 Our
ﬁnding of tax clientele eﬀects in the Swedish stock market adds to a broader tax literature, which
examines the trade-oﬀ between taxes and risk-taking across asset classes (see Poterba and Samwick
(2002) and references). For example, the formation of tax clienteles across stocks and bonds is
central to the capital structure theory of Miller (1977).4 If there are tax clientele eﬀects in the
stock market, where the beneﬁts of diversiﬁcation ought to be the strongest, then tax clienteles are
also likely to form across assets where the diversiﬁcation beneﬁts are weaker.5
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the relevant details of the
Swedish tax code. The empirical results are reported in Section 3. The curious phenomenon of
corporations that hold stock portfolios is analyzed in Section 4. Section 5 concludes the paper and
points to directions for future research.
2 Institutional Background & Data
2.1 Data
We study Swedish exchange-listed ﬁrms in the period 2001–2005. Financial data are taken from
Thomson Financial and the Stockholm Stock Exchange. Descriptive statistics on the sample ﬁrms
and their payout policies are displayed in Table 1. The two top rows present that the number
of ﬁrms varies between 254 and 288 per year and the market capitalization between SEK 1,760
and 2,802 billion.6 The rest of the table provides statistics on dividends. Dividends are paid
annually after the approval of the shareholder meeting. Approximately 50% of the listed ﬁrms
pay dividends, but the market value of the dividend-paying ﬁrms is more than 80% of market
capitalization. The aggregate dividends between 2001 and 2004 are approximately SEK 60 billion,
3Miller and Scholes (1978) propose the hypothesis that investors can oﬀset dividend tax liability entirely by
borrowing to purchase the stock portfolio and deduct the dividends against the interest rate payments on the loan.
Whether such tax avoidance strategies are being used depends on the investor’s tolerance towards the risk of the
levered stock portfolio.
4See also Auerbach and King (1983), who extend Miller’s (1977) model of tax tradeoﬀs to also include risk.
5For example, the persistent spread in bond yields between regular treasury securities and tax-exempt municipal
bonds suggests that there are tax clienteles in the bond market where the beneﬁts from diversiﬁcation are smaller
than in the stock market (see, for example, pages 340-345 in Sundaresan (2002)).
6The SEK/USD exchange rate has varied between 6.5 and 10.5 during the sample period.
4which implies dividend yields between 2% and 3.5%. In 2005 there is a general increase in dividends
(to about SEK 90 billion), but the dividend yield is similar to earlier years (3.1%). In addition
to the dividends, approximately 10% of the Swedish ﬁrms repurchase shares through open market
purchases. However, they are small relative the dividends. The data are generally skewed: The
market value of the ten largest ﬁrms is more than 50% of stock market capitalization; ten ﬁrms pay
more than 50% of aggregate dividends; and the market share of the 50 largest investors is almost
50% of stock market capitalization. Concentration of dividends among large capitalization ﬁrms is
also a feature of the US stock market (see Fama and French (2001)).
Ownership of Swedish listed stocks is organized as book entries by the Nordic Central Securities
Depository (NCSD). Regulations require that exchange-listed ﬁrms use the securities depository
for registration of stock ownership.7 Each investor or custodian bank must have an account in the
securities depository. According to law, a complete ownership record of all domestic shareholders
must be established on the last bank day of June and December each year. The law requires
Swedish banks to reveal the identities of the owners of all shares held in custody, but foreign banks
do not have to report the nominee identity.
We obtain ten cross-sections of stock ownership for June and December each year in 2001-2005,
but will in the empirical work use annual cross-sections (the June record). Each record displays
the name of the shareholder, an organization identiﬁcation number, the number of shares held, and
a security identiﬁcation code. The formation of individual stock portfolios can be based on the
organization number for organizations and the name for individuals and proprietorships for whom
the identiﬁcation numbers have been omitted. The foreign stock portfolios are eliminated, because
we do not know the identity of the beneﬁcial owner of shares in custody.
With the data from Thomson Financial we compute factor loadings (betas) in one and three
factor regression models and idiosyncratic risks as the standard deviations of the residuals from
the same regressions. The betas capture exposures to the market, high-minus-low book-to-market
ratios (HML), and small-minus-big market capitalization (SMB). These measures will be used as
ﬁrm characteristics and later proxy for investors’ investment opportunities. We also consider two
7Some non-listed ﬁrms and bond issuers also use the securities depository for record keeping. The bond ownership
data in the securities depository are conﬁdential.
5liquidity variables, turnover rate (total trading in a stock relative its market capitalization) and
spread (bid-ask spread in relation to its price), obtained from the Stockholm Stock Exchange. We
further collect information on a ﬁrm’s use of dual class shares and whether individuals’ holdings
in a ﬁrm’s shares are exempt from a wealth tax, or not. These data are later used to capture
dimensions beyond taxes that may be important for investors’ portfolio holdings.
2.2 Taxation of Dividends & Capital Gains
Stock ownership generates dividends and capital gains. Dividends are taxed when they are paid
and capital gains when the investor sells the stock to another investor in the secondary market or
back to the ﬁrm in a share repurchase. This section explains how Swedish investors are taxed on
dividends and capital gains. The tax rules have remained largely unchanged since 1991.
Individuals. Ordinary income and investment income are taxed as separate income classes. Or-
dinary income is subject to a progressive tax schedule. The average tax rate in the highest income
bracket is 67.2%.8 Dividends and capital gains are taxed as investment income at the 30% rate.
Capital loss on stocks is deductible against other income, but loss limitations apply.9 Estates are
taxed as individuals and all tax obligations of the deceased individual are passed on to the estate.
Businesses. Investment income is lumped together with operating income and taxed at the 28%
rate. Capital loss is fully deductible; it can be carried forward indeﬁnitely, but cannot be carried
back. Intercorporate dividends and capital gains are tax free if the ownership fraction of the voting





(1 − 0.566) = 0.672,
where 32.46% is the social security tax rate and 56.6% is the sum of the local tax rate (average of 31.6%) and the
state tax rate (25% for income above SEK 465,200 in 2005). There is no cap on the income to which social security
taxes apply.
9Capital loss on stock is fully deductible against capital gains on other stocks, but only 70% against other invest-
ment income. Negative investment income can also oﬀset tax liability on ordinary income. The tax reduction is 30%
times the deﬁcit up to SEK 100,000 and 21% times the deﬁcit above SEK 100,000. This means that capital loss saves
taxes at rates 30% (gains on stock), 21% (investment income, ordinary income up to the limit), and 14.7% (ordinary
income above the limit).
6rights exceeds 25% up to 2003 and 10% thereafter.10 Business taxation applies to corporations,
associations, and foundations, but a variety of business organizations are not taxed this way. The
following two business organizations are taxed on imputed income:
• Life insurance companies and pension funds: Income is deﬁned as the average treasury rate
during the year times the market value of the stock portfolio in the beginning of the year.
The tax rate on imputed income is 15%.
• Banks and brokerage houses: Stocks can be held only for trading purposes. Income is deﬁned
as the sum of all sales minus the sum of all purchases plus the change in the market value of
the inventory during the year (mark-to-market principle). The tax rate is 28%.
In the next group of business organizations, income passes through to the owners:
• Investment funds: Dividends are taxed as investment income by the recipients, while capital
gains accrue tax free within the fund. Fund owners pay capital gains tax when they sell
shares in the fund. These tax rules mean that short-term trading proﬁts for the fund are
transformed into long-term trading proﬁts for the investor. This tax beneﬁt comes at the
expense of a tax on the net asset value of the stock portfolio similar to the taxation of life
insurance companies and pension funds.
• Partnerships: Income from a stock portfolio is taxed as ordinary income by the partners.
The transformation of investment income into ordinary income discourages individuals from
owning stock through a partnership as the marginal tax rate on ordinary income (67.2%) is
much higher than that on investment income (30%). For a business partner the transformation
makes no diﬀerence as the tax rate is 28% in either case.
• Sole proprietorships: Income from a stock portfolio is taxed by the proprietor as investment
income (30% rate). Stock clubs are taxed this way.
10Morck (2005) documents similar tax rules in most developed countries except the US where inter-corporate
dividends are taxed for the explicit reason to discourage the formation of business groups.
7Government Entities, Charities, and Non-Proﬁts. Government entities are exempt from
taxation. Charitable organizations are exempt from taxation of investment income. Other non-
proﬁt organizations are taxed as businesses (see above).
2.3 Tax Preferences
Let τd and τg be the marginal tax rates on dividends and capital gains, respectively. We compute
the relative tax preference for dividends over capital gains for all investors and identify three tax
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1.00 A. Tax-neutral organizations
0.85 B. Businesses and individuals
0.70 C. Investment funds
(1)
Tax-neutral organizations (A) exhibit the strongest relative preference for dividends. Life in-
surance companies, pension funds, and banks and brokers are tax neutral between dividends and
capital gains, because they are taxed on imputed income. Government entities and charities are
tax neutral, because they are tax-exempt.
Businesses and individuals (B) prefer capital gains to dividends, because capital gains tax
can be postponed. Bailey (1969) estimates the value of deferral to 50% of the statutory rate,
Protopapadakis (1983) ﬁnds estimates in the order of 25%, and Chay, Choi, and Pontiﬀ (2006) ﬁnd
it to be 55%.11 Green and Holliﬁeld (2003) model the advantage of deferral and ﬁnd numerically
that the eﬀective tax rate on capital gains amounts to approximately 60% of the statutory rate.
In equation (1) and what follows, we ignore the small diﬀerence in marginal tax rates between
businesses and individuals and assume it is 30%, and we apply the numerical result of Green and
Holliﬁeld (2003), so that τg =0 .60 × 30% = 18%.
Investment funds (C) prefer capital gains, because dividends pass through and trigger immediate
taxation for the recipient while capital gains accrue tax free within the fund. The dividend tax is
11Much of the US literature assumes that the eﬀective capital gains tax rate is 25% of the statutory rate (e.g.,
Graham (2003)). This is based on Bailey (1969), who multiplies the estimated value of deferral 50% with the estimated
value of the option to reset the cost basis to market value at death, which is also 50%. We do not follow this approach
because the Swedish tax code does not allow the estate to reset the cost basis to market value (see above).
8paid by the investment fund on behalf of the recipient. In equation (1), we assume that individuals
own the investment funds. Mutual funds also manage tax-deferred accounts under the Premium
Pension Authority (PPM). We ignore this ambiguity about the tax status of investment fund owners,
because the new pension system that started in 2000 is relatively small. A few large closed-end
funds are traded in the stock market and included in our sample. The shares are owned by both
individuals and organizations and, presumably, the tax preference parameter is a weighted average
of 0.700 (individuals), 0.720 (businesses) and 1.000 (tax neutral). This complication, which applies
to only a few observations, is also ignored.
We exclude partnerships from equation (1), because the tax preference depends on the iden-
tities of the partners: 0.657 (individuals), 0.865, (businesses), and 1.000 (tax neutral). Without
information on the ownership structure, we think that the inclusion of partnerships only adds noise.
The calculations in (1) assume that investors have taxable income. If investors can oﬀset divi-
dends and capital gains against capital losses, the relative tax preferences change somewhat. Loss
deductions are irrelevant for tax-neutral organizations and investment funds. Businesses become
tax neutral, while individuals still prefer capital gains as a result of loss limitations (see footnote 9).
We assume that investors make long-term investments and ignore the possibility that businesses
and individuals may want to re-balance their portfolios when they have capital losses.
2.4 Identiﬁcation of Investor Tax Preferences
Statistics Sweden classiﬁes organizations by a two-digit code for organizational form, which we use
to sort investors into tax clienteles. The organization code was originally created to facilitate the
exchange of information in the public sector. The tax administration uses the code to distribute
the appropriate tax form to each organization. Table 2 presents the organization type, the tax form
number, and our inference on the organization’s tax status. There are 21 diﬀerent organizations
including individuals in the table. The tax status is unambiguous for the 12 organizations in the
top of the table. Additional information is required to classify the tax status of the next ﬁve
organizations. The last four organizations in the bottom of the table are not studied.
For the ﬁve organizations with ambiguous tax status, the name uniquely identiﬁes life in-
9surance (A), property and casualty insurance (B), pension funds (A), and closed-end funds (C).
Brokerage houses (A) are identiﬁed by the register of the Swedish Association of Stock Brokers,
and controlling shares (A) by the 10% and 25% ownership cutoﬀs. Non-proﬁt organizations must
ﬁle a tax return each year. The local tax oﬃcer decides whether the organization is charitable
and qualiﬁes for tax-exempt investment income (A) or the organization is subject to business tax-
ation (B). We classify non-proﬁt organizations with charitable-related names as tax exempt (A)
and non-proﬁt organizations with names related to a speciﬁc group of people as businesses (B).
Foundations are harder to classify than associations as they are typically named after the donor.
A few scientiﬁc foundations (A) are well-known to the authors. Foundations with a relationship to
a business are classiﬁed as taxed (B). The name method classiﬁes 88% of the associations and 29%
of the foundations. Non-classiﬁed non-proﬁt organizations are not considered.
2.5 Portfolio Characteristics
Table 3 reports averages of portfolio characteristics for major investor types sorted by tax prefer-
ences and, within each panel, by average portfolio size. In addition to the organizations in Table 2
above, we have classiﬁed corporations as public if the ﬁrm itself or the parent of the business group
to which the ﬁrm belongs is registered in the securities depository, or as private if the ﬁrm or the
parent is outside the securities depository. The intercorporate ownership structure is taken from
the database Market Manager. The table is based on more than two million stock portfolios with
a combined market share of 64%. The missing shares are held by foreign investors (33.9%), as-
sociations and foundations with unknown tax status, domestic organizations with unknown type,
and partnerships. The small number of partnerships, 943, and their insigniﬁcant market share,
less than 0.05%, is consistent with tax incentives which discourage individuals from holding stocks
through partnership.
The variation in average portfolio size across investor types is noticeable. Life insurance com-
panies hold the largest and most diversiﬁed portfolios. Closed-end funds are also very large, but
they hold on average only 10 stocks. Mutual funds, non-life insurance companies, the public sector,
and banks hold medium size portfolios with approximately 20 stocks. Pension funds, charities, and
10non-proﬁts hold smaller and less diversiﬁed portfolios. We only consider investors’ direct invest-
ments in domestic stocks and do not have information on the number of foreign stocks they hold.
Adding the foreign stocks would most likely increase the number of stocks held by mutual funds
and pension funds. We also do not observe other ﬁnancial or real assets in investors’ portfolios.
The smallest and least diversiﬁed portfolios are held by private ﬁrms and individuals. The small
number of directly owned stocks in individuals’ portfolios is also a striking feature of the Survey of
Consumer Finances (see Polkovnichenko (2005)). Calvet, Campbell, and Sodini (2006) show that
Swedish individuals diversify through ownership of mutual funds. Swedish individual investors also
hold a real claim on the social security system, which is extensive and well-diversiﬁed. Individual
investors dominate our sample with more than two million stock portfolios of which approximately
one million consist of only one stock with a tiny market value below SEK 15,000. More than
600,000 such one-stock portfolios are invested in one of three stocks (Ericsson, Telia-Sonera, and
F¨ oreningssparbanken). The small aggregate market share of individuals in the amount of 14.5%
is in line with 7.2%, 8.9%, and 16.5% reported for Finland, Norway, and the UK, respectively.12
Aggregate ownership by individuals in the US stock market is not available to us.
There is a manifested variation in the portfolio strategies across investor types. Large portfolios
held by institutional investors are tilted towards value stocks (small negative HML coeﬃcients)
with high dividend yield. Small portfolios held by private corporations show the opposite traits.
They are tilted towards growth stocks (large negative HML coeﬃcients) with low dividend yield.
Estates and stock clubs also follow this investment strategy. We report the frequency distribution
of the HML betas, the number of stocks, and the portfolio values in Figures 1–3. The distributions
are shown for each tax clientele, where clientele B is further divided into B1 (Businesses) and B2
(Individuals). There is a striking tendency for businesses to hold growth stocks with very low
HML betas. The dominance of few stocks in portfolios held by businesses and individuals is also
apparent, as is the higher portfolio values for investment funds.
12See Karhunen and Keloharju (2001) for Finland, Dai and Rydqvist (2006) for Norway, and Bell and Jenkinson
(2002) for the UK.
113 Empirical Results
We evaluate the tax eﬀects in the cross-section of stock portfolios. The data are less suitable
for time-series analysis, so we do not report any results relating to clientele shifts around dividend
initiations and omissions or new stock listings and delistings. Also, we do not investigate shareholder
preferences for share repurchasing stocks over no payout stocks as both are subject to capital gains
taxation.
3.1 Aggregate Stock Portfolios
The starting point of our analysis is the Capital Asset Pricing Model extended with taxes by
Brennan (1970), Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979), and Allen, Bernardo, and Welch (2000). In
these models, if investors are suﬃciently risk averse, the tax eﬀects become negligible and investors
hold the market portfolio. This also means that an investor have the same ownership fraction in each
ﬁrm in the market. This is our null hypothesis, which we evaluate against the alternative that tax-
neutral investors (A) tilt their portfolios towards dividend-paying stocks, that investment funds (C)
tilt their portfolios away from dividend-paying stocks, and that businesses and individuals (B) fall
somewhere between the two extremes.
To test these hypotheses, we construct the aggregate stock portfolios of all investors that belong
to tax clientele k = A,B,C. Table 4 presents summary statistics of variables averaged over the years
in the sample. The evidence is mixed. Consistent with the tax clientele hypothesis, the dividend
yield on the tax neutral portfolio (A) is higher than the dividend yield on the portfolio of business
and individuals (B) which, in turn, is higher than the dividend yield on the portfolio of investment
funds (C). The yield spread between tax-neutral portfolios (A) and investment funds (C) is 40
basis points. Also consistent with the tax clientele hypothesis, the stock portfolio of tax-neutral
investors (A) has the largest weight in dividend-paying stocks. However, inconsistent with the
dividend tax clientele hypothesis, the portfolio weight of businesses and individuals (B) falls below
that of investment funds (C). We use regression analysis to demonstrate that these patterns are
robust to the inclusion of control variables.
123.2 Individual Stock Portfolios
Theory determines the portfolio weight as a function of the stock’s risk characteristics, dividend
yield, and the investors’ tax preferences. However, the individual stock portfolio data described
above are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the predictions of the Capital Asset Pricing Model. Regressing
individual ownership fractions on a set of explanatory variables is also statistically diﬃcult. For
example, the many single-stock portfolios would appear with the portfolio weight of 100% in one
stock and 0% in all other stocks. We oﬀer two solutions. In this section, we follow the approach of
Pettit (1977), Scholz (1992), and Graham and Kumar (2006) and deﬁne the portfolio dividend yield
as the dependent variable. The idea is that preferences, beliefs, and budget constraints determine
the optimal portfolios, which are associated with a dividend yield. In the subsequent section, we
calculate aggregate ownership fractions of the tax clienteles A, B, and C and relate those to the
d i v i d e n dp a y o u to fﬁ r m s .
For each investor i in year t, we compute the dividend yield Yit and estimate a pooled linear
regression model of the dividend yield on dummy variables Dk
it for each tax clientele and a set of
control variables Xit:
Yit = β0t + γBDB
it + γCDC
it + β Xit + εit. (2)
T h et a xc l i e n t e l eh y p o t h e s i si m p l i e st h a t :
0 >γ B >γ C. (3)
We also estimate a regression where we replace the tax clientele dummies with the tax preference
parameter θit for each investor i in year t:
Yit = β0t + γθit + β Xit + εit. (4)
For this speciﬁcation, the tax clientele hypothesis predicts that γ>0.
The characteristics of individuals’ stock portfolios are markedly diﬀerent from those of organi-
zations (see Table 3 above). Adding more than two million stock portfolios to an equally-weighted
13regression means that the coeﬃcients of the control variables, but not the tax variables, are deter-
mined by the characteristics of the average individual’s stock portfolio. We therefore report the
results from estimating regression models (2) and (4) without the stock portfolios of individuals.
Below we comment on the regression results when individuals’ portfolios are included.
The main regression results are reported in Table 5. Standard errors are reported below the
coeﬃcients. The standard errors reported throughout the paper are based on a pair-wise bootstrap
(500 replications) accounting for conditional heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. Asymptotic
standard errors from a GMM estimation, also accounting for conditional heteroskedasticity and
serial correlation, are very similar to the bootstrap standard errors and are therefore not reported
in the tables. Speciﬁcations 1a, 2a, and 3a refer to regression equation (2) and speciﬁcations 4a
and 5a refer to equation (4). The tax clientele dummies enter with negative signs and the tax
preference parameter with a positive sign. The coeﬃcients are statistically diﬀerent from zero.
The coeﬃcients in speciﬁcations 2a–5a are consistent with the dividend tax clientele hypothesis
but, in speciﬁcation 1a, the coeﬃcients of businesses (B) are more negative than the coeﬃcient of
investment funds (C). The magnitudes are economically meaningful. The yield spread between A
and C is between 30 and 60 basis points. Consistent with Pettit (1977), dividend yield decreases
with market beta and, as in Graham and Kumar (2006), dividend yield increases with HML beta
and decreases with idiosyncratic risk.
The bottom of Table 5 shows that 29.9% of the portfolios are clustered at a zero dividend
yield, which means that the coeﬃcients in a linear model may predict negative dividend yields. We
examine the sensitivity to the clustering at zero by trimming the sample (Table 6) and by estimating
a Tobit model (Table 7). Since zero-yield portfolios are most common among investors with only
a few stocks, we expect the problem to be most critical for the estimation of the coeﬃcients of
businesses (B).
T h el e f tp a n e li nT a b l e6e x c l u d e sp o r t f o l i o sw i t hl e s st h a nﬁ v es t o c k s ,t h em i d d l ep a n e lp o r t f o l i o s
with a market value below SEK 250,000, and the right panel portfolios of businesses (B). The
number of observations and the percentages of zeros decrease dramatically. In all three panels the
signs of the coeﬃcients are the same as in the full sample. The magnitude of the coeﬃcients for
14investment funds (C) is about the same, while the coeﬃcients for businesses (B) are smaller.
Table 7 presents results from a Tobit estimation. The top panel reports the estimated coeﬃcients
with standard errors. The results are similar to those using trimmed samples. The bottom panel
evaluates the diﬀerences in expected yield spreads due to diﬀerences in relative tax preferences at
the averages of the control variables for tax-neutral investors.13 The resulting yield spreads are
similar to those reported in Table 6. In sum, the portfolios held by tax-neutral investors present
a robust signiﬁcant diﬀerence in dividend yields relative investment funds, whereas the diﬀerences
relative portfolios held by businesses are sensitive to the empirical speciﬁcation.
Many variables can inﬂuence investors’ portfolio choices. Above, we attempt to control for
investors’ trade-oﬀ between risk and return. We have also examined two measures of liquidity,
turnover rate and bid-ask spread, but they do not change the results signiﬁcantly. We have left out
variables which may inﬂuence the stock portfolios of individuals only. For example, employees may
own stock in their own company as a part of an incentive package, founding family members own
stock in their own company by inheritance and for control purposes, and individuals may prefer
stocks that are exempt from wealth tax. When we include individuals’ portfolios, allowing for
diﬀerent coeﬃcients on the control variables for individuals, we ﬁnd very similar results as before.
The tax coeﬃcient on individuals is signiﬁcantly negative, but the economic magnitude varies
across diﬀerent regression speciﬁcations. This indicates the diﬃculty in capturing the portfolios of
individual investors.
Statutes sometimes restrict charities to make distributions from dividends only and not from
realized capital gains or principal.14 This variable cannot be constructed without the statutes of
the non-proﬁt organizations. However, the regression results without the foundations are similar.
13Computing diﬀerences in expected yield spreads at the grand average or at averages of other investor clienteles
give similar results.
14An oﬃcial at the local authority which supervises foundations (Tillsynsmyndigheten f¨ or stiftelser i Stockholms
l¨ an) estimated that 30% of the foundations can only distribute dividends, especially older foundations, 20% can
distribute dividends and realized capital gains, and 50% have no explicit restriction and can therefore make payments
from its principal.
153.3 Firm-Level Ownership
For each tax clientele k, we compute the aggregate ownership fraction Fk
jt in ﬁrm j in year t,a n d
estimate a pooled linear regression model of the ownership fraction on a dividend dummy variable




0t + δkDjt + βk  Xjt + εk
jt,k = A,B,C. (5)
The δk parameter captures, conditional on the ﬁrm characteristics Xjt, the over- or under-weighting
in dividend-paying stocks of clientele k. Under the null hypothesis that the aggregate investors
hold equal market shares across ﬁrms, the coeﬃcients of the dividend dummy are all zero. The tax
clientele hypothesis predicts that the coeﬃcients can be sorted according to tax preferences:
δA >δ B >δ C. (6)
The regression is equally-weighted which is correct under the null hypothesis that the ownership
fractions are equal across ﬁrms.
The regression results are reported in Table 8. The coeﬃcient of the dividend dummy is positive
for tax-neutral investors (A) and investment funds (C). These portfolios are tilted towards dividend-
paying stocks by approximately seven and ﬁve percentage points, respectively. For businesses and
individuals (B) the coeﬃcients are negative and suggest that these investors tilt their portfolios
away from dividend-paying stocks by about ten percentage points. Consistent with the tax clientele
hypothesis (6), tax-neutral investors display a stronger preference for dividend paying stocks than
any of the other tax clienteles. The diﬀerences between tax neutral investors (A) and any of the
other tax clienteles are statistically signiﬁcant at usual signiﬁcance levels (not reported in the table).
However, inconsistent with the tax clientele hypothesis (6), the coeﬃcients for investment funds (C)
are larger than those of businesses and individuals (B).
Missing control variables may explain the mixed evidence for the tax clientele hypothesis. In-
vestment funds may be bound to a diversiﬁcation strategy which forces them to stay close to the
market portfolio. Swedish index funds have no choice but to hold the market portfolio and, by con-
16struction, the largest investment funds cannot deviate much from the market portfolio. The ﬁve
largest investment funds hold together more than 10% of stock market capitalization. Businesses
and individuals are small and have no commitment to diversify across stocks.
4 Corporate Stock Portfolios
More than 28,000 portfolios are held by private corporations (see Table 3). The average dividend
yield on these portfolios is low (1.45%), average portfolio size is small (SEK 2.1 million), and the
portfolios are tilted toward growth stocks as suggested by the low average HML betas (–1.03). Why
do corporations buy growth stocks? We propose a tax-based explanation.
Special tax rules pertain to income from a private corporation, where the owner (or his relatives)
is also employed. The purpose of these rules is to tax labor income the same way regardless of
whether it is earned directly as wages or channeled through a partnership or a corporation. The top
marginal tax rate on dividends from a private corporation is 68.7% compared to the top marginal
tax rate on wages and partnership income 67.2%.15 Together with the corporate tax of 28%, it
implies that a dividend on a stock portfolio that passes through to its ﬁnal owner is subject to
triple taxation at a marginal tax rate of 77.5%. The taxation of capital gains from selling shares
in the private ﬁrm is more favorable. A capital gain that exceeds approximately SEK eight million
is taxed as investment income at the 30% rate.16 A private ﬁrm cannot repurchase shares.
Corporations may hold a liquid stock portfolio for future investments in operating assets. Cor-
porations may also hold stocks to oﬀset pension liabilities for the employees. However, we conjecture
that many corporate stock portfolios in our data serve as supplemental retirement accounts for the
owners. A portfolio of non-dividend paying stocks does not trigger any taxes before the owner sells
the private ﬁrm. Saving for retirement through a stock portfolio held by the ﬁrm has the advan-
15The rules are complex and change frequently. A small dividend can be paid tax free. An additional amount, which
depends on paid-in-capital and total wages paid to employees other than the owner, is subject to 30% investment
income tax. The excess dividend is taxed as wage income at marginal tax rate 56.6%, but is not subject to social
security tax. Therefore, the marginal tax rate on corporate income is
(1 − 0.28)(1 − 0.566) = 0.687.
16A capital gain below SEK eight million is taxed as half investment income (30% rate) and half ordinary income
(56.6% rate).
17tage that the portfolio can be liquidated at any time and used for other purposes than retirement.
This beneﬁt must be weighted against the advantage of private pension and deferred compensation
plans, which are protected by the limited liability of the corporation.17 Accounting data support
the retirement hypothesis. Using data from Market Manager, we compute the ratio of the market
value of the stock portfolio to the book value of total assets for ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms,
respectively. Most ﬁnancial ﬁrms are securities trading companies, while the non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms
span manufacturing, construction, trade, and service. Table 9 presents the distribution of the ratio.
Since we are mixing market and book values, the ratio sometimes exceeds 100%. A number of ﬁrms
have a signiﬁcant part of their assets in stock portfolios. In more than 3,000 non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms
(or 13% of the ﬁrms), the ratio exceeds 50%. These ﬁrms are better characterized as private stock
funds than operating ﬁrms. Importantly, when we divide the non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms into ﬁrms with
assets below and above SEK 2 million, the result is not driven by the smaller ﬁrms in the sample.
Also, the distributions are very similar across industries (manufacturing, construction, trade, and
service). Note that investment-fund tax status does not apply to private ﬁrms.
5 Conclusions
We conclude that there are dividend tax clienteles in the Swedish stock market. The main support-
ing evidence is the dividend yield spread between tax neutral stock portfolios (A) and investment
funds (C). Theoretically, this is where we expect to ﬁnd the strongest tax eﬀect and the estimated
yield spread in the order of 40 basis points is economically meaningful. The ambiguous ordering
of business portfolios (B) is also interesting. In some econometric speciﬁcations, the average busi-
ness portfolio sorts nicely between the average tax-neutral portfolio and the investment fund, but
in other speciﬁcations, the business portfolios exhibit stronger dividend aversion than investment
funds. Empirically, we cannot tell whether businesses choose growth stocks with low dividend yield,
b e c a u s et h eo w n e r so ft h o s eb u s i n e s s e sl i k eg r o w t hs t o c k so rb e c a u s et h eb u s i n e s so w n e r sw a n tt o
17Social security is the basis for retirement in Sweden. Payments to private pension plans and deferred compensation
plans are made after social security taxes, but before ordinary income tax. The maximum before-tax amount is SEK
39,300 per year for private pension plans and SEK 394,000 for deferred compensation plans. Accordingly, the stock
portfolio has the additional advantages that there is no upper limit and social security taxes must not be paid.
18avoid taxes. The abundance of portfolios of private corporations that invest in low-yield, growth
stocks suggests that the owners of many business portfolios want to avoid taxes.
We have studied the portfolio implications of the asymmetric taxation of dividends and capital
gains in Sweden. While some features of the Swedish tax code are speciﬁc, we believe that the
two main tax asymmetries are common. First, businesses and individuals (B) prefer capital gains
over dividends as a result of the realization principle. The alternative, the accrual principle that
applies to banks and brokerage houses, is less common. Second, Swedish investment funds (C)
prefer tax-free capital gains over taxed dividends. We believe this is a common tax treatment of
many foreign stock portfolios, which are subject to withholding tax on dividends but pay no other
taxes. For example, a US pension fund that purchases Swedish stocks is subject to 15% withholding
tax on dividends but 0% tax on capital gains. The presence of such investors may contribute to
explaining why foreign investors underweight in dividend-paying stocks and in the aggregate has
the lowest dividend yield (see Table 4). However, the eﬀect of dividends on foreigners’ portfolio
composition is a topic for future research.
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22Table 1: Firms and Dividend Payout
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Number of ﬁrms 288 280 276 265 254
Market value of ﬁrms 2,650 1,909 1,760 2,331 2,802
Number of ﬁrms paying dividends 159 141 138 141 146
(in % of total) (55.2) (50.4) (50.0) (53.2) (57.5)
Market value of ﬁrms paying dividends 2,465 1,674 1,511 1,851 2,663
(in % of total) (93.0) (87.7) (85.8) (79.4) (95.0)
Dividends 66.6 50.6 56.9 66.9 91.3
Dividend yield 2.04 2.02 3.45 3.06 3.15
The table presents summary statistics for the ﬁrms in the sample over the period
2001–2005. All values are reported in SEK billion. Dividend yields are reported in %.
23Table 2: Organization and Tax Status
Organization Tax form Tax status Classiﬁcation method
Bank corporations 2 A
Mutual savings banks 2 A
Public sector 3 A
Religious associations 3 A
For-proﬁt associations 2 B
Condominium associations 2 B
Common interest property 2 B
Family foundations 3 B
Individuals & sole proprietorships 1 B
Estates 1 B
Multi-person proprietorships None B
Investment funds 2 C
Insurance corporations 2 A,B Life (A), non-life (B)
Mutual insurance companies 2 A,B Life (A), non-life (B)
Other corporations 2 A,B,C Control/trader (A), fund (C), other (B)
Other non-proﬁt associations 3 A,B Pension (A), name-based (A or B)
Other foundations & funds 3 A,B Pension (A), name-based (A or B)
Partnerships 4 n/a
Foreign institutions 2 n/a
Other organizations 3 n/a
Under investigation 2/3 n/a
The table presents the oﬃcial tax form number and our inference on the tax status of organizations
and individuals. The oﬃcial tax forms are for individuals (1), businesses (2), charities and non-proﬁts
(3), and partnerships (4). The tax status is based on equation (1): Tax neutral (A), businesses and
individuals (B), and investment funds (C). Life insurance is separated from non-life insurance by the
organizations name. Controlling shares are identiﬁed by the cutoﬀs 10% and 25% of the voting rights.
Brokerage houses and closed-end funds are separated from other corporations by the organizations
name. The tax status of non-proﬁt organizations is based on the organizations name: Tax neutral (A)
if the organization name contains words associated with pension fund, children, animal protection,
nature, religion, scientiﬁc, education, defense, museum, sports, arts, music, culture, political party, and
health care; Business taxation (B) if the organization name contains words associated with business
activity, labor union, stock club, employee proﬁt plan, and social club, or the association is named





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































A. Tax neutral 3.07 93.1 630.0 27.6 2,608
B. Businesses & individuals 2.72 86.0 488.7 21.4 2,079,517
C. Investment funds 2.67 88.3 346.4 15.1 365
A–C 2.86 89.6 1,465.1 64.0 2,082,490
X. Foreign investors 2.50 85.4 775.6 33.9 123,468
X. Unclassiﬁed 3.37 90.5 49.8 2.2 24,032
Total sample 2.74 88.2 2,290.5 100.0 2,229,990
The table presents statistics, averaged over years, for the aggregate tax clienteles in the sample. Market
values are reported in SEK billion. Dividend yields and market shares are reported in %.
26Table 5: Dividend Yields and Tax Preferences
1a 2a 3a 4a 5a
2001 dummy 2.828 4.731 4.219 2.722 2.620
(0.028) (0.025) (0.039) (0.104) (0.108)
2002 dummy 2.355 4.344 3.823 2.335 2.224
(0.028) (0.023) (0.037) (0.103) (0.107)
2003 dummy 2.879 4.813 4.287 2.804 2.689
(0.028) (0.023) (0.036) (0.104) (0.106)
2004 dummy 2.677 4.575 4.049 2.566 2.451
(0.027) (0.023) (0.037) (0.102) (0.106)
2005 dummy 3.153 5.042 4.526 3.033 2.927
(0.027) (0.023) (0.037) (0.102) (0.106)
B. Businesses –1.257 –0.303 –0.230
(0.027) (0.021) (0.020)
C. Investment funds –0.335 –0.592 –0.534
(0.045) (0.032) (0.033)
Tax preference θ 2.008 1.606
(0.116) (0.113)
Beta (Market) –1.031 –0.557 –1.031 –0.558
(0.013) (0.022) (0.013) (0.023)
Beta (HML) 1.185 1.184
(0.009) (0.009)
Beta (SMB) 0.297 0.297
(0.025) (0.025)
Idiosyncratic risk –0.029 –0.026 –0.029 –0.026
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Adjusted R2 4.6 43.2 45.1 43.2 45.1
N 164,743 164,743 164,743 164,743 164,743
N0 29.9 29.9 29.9 29.9 29.9
The table presents the results of pooled least square regressions of dividend yield on portfolio char-
acteristics over 2001–2005, as in regression equations (2) and (4). B. Businesses and C. Investment
funds refer to dummy variables, which are equal to one if an investor belongs to clientele B and C,
respectively, and otherwise zero. Clientele B includes Businesses and excludes individuals. The
tax preference θ is deﬁned as in expression (1). The betas are the factor loadings in a market
model regression or in a three factor model regression (market; high-minus-low book-to-market
ratio, HML, or value-minus-growth; small-minus-big market capitalization, SMB). Idiosyncratic
risk is the (annualized) standard deviation of the residuals from the same regressions. Standard er-
rors based on a pairwise bootstrap (500 replications) accounting for conditional heteroskedasticity
and serial correlation are reported in parentheses. The adjusted R-squares in the regressions are
reported in %. N is the total number of observations available; N0 is the number of observations
with zero dividend yield expressed in % of total number of observations.
27Table 6: Dividend Yields and Tax Preferences in Trimmed Samples
Number of stocks ≥ 5 Portfolio value ≥ SEK 250,000 Clienteles A and C only
1b 3b 5b 1c 3c 5c 1d 3d 5d
2001 dummy 2.530 4.724 3.883 2.718 4.245 3.026 2.369 4.583 2.793
(0.025) (0.056) (0.091) (0.030) (0.068) (0.136) (0.037) (0.152) (0.165)
2002 dummy 2.209 4.206 3.368 2.574 3.755 2.536 2.236 4.279 2.605
(0.024) (0.052) (0.089) (0.029) (0.065) (0.134) (0.034) (0.149) (0.158)
2003 dummy 3.495 4.907 4.074 3.610 4.552 3.334 3.399 5.096 3.306
(0.027) (0.049) (0.087) (0.029) (0.063) (0.133) (0.038) (0.144) (0.151)
2004 dummy 3.051 4.575 3.742 2.967 4.203 2.985 2.861 4.640 2.833
(0.024) (0.051) (0.089) (0.030) (0.067) (0.133) (0.040) (0.150) (0.160)
2005 dummy 3.202 4.827 3.992 3.202 4.527 3.309 3.011 4.864 3.051
(0.023) (0.048) (0.088) (0.029) (0.066) (0.132) (0.041) (0.156) (0.165)
B. Businesses –0.642 –0.045 –0.837 –0.145
(0.025) (0.016) (0.029) (0.025)
C. Investment funds –0.342 –0.457 –0.562 –0.504 –0.337 –0.559
(0.037) (0.025) (0.044) (0.033) (0.044) (0.033)
Tax preference θ 0.887 1.247 1.800
(0.088) (0.132) (0.103)
Beta (Market) –0.900 –0.909 –0.602 –0.605 –1.033 –1.033
(0.045) (0.047) (0.043) (0.043) (0.139) (0.139)
Beta (HML) 1.568 1.560 1.323 1.318 1.450 1.450
(0.020) (0.020) (0.023) (0.022) (0.036) (0.036)
Beta (SMB) 0.642 0.664 0.414 0.418 0.742 0.742
(0.048) (0.046) (0.053) (0.054) (0.106) (0.105)
Idiosyncratic risk –0.047 –0.046 –0.030 –0.029 –0.024 –0.024
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Adjusted R2 12.1 54.5 54.3 5.8 41.4 41.4 4.9 41.4 41.4
N 44,426 44,426 44,426 74,513 74,513 74,513 14,865 14,865 14,865
N0 2.5 2.5 2.5 7.6 7.6 7.6 8.2 8.2 8.2
The table presents the results of pooled least square regressions of dividend yield on portfolio characteristics over 2001–2005.
Speciﬁcations 1b, 3b, and 5b only include portfolios with ﬁve holding or more; speciﬁcation 1c, 3c, and 5c only include
portfolios with a market value of SEK 250,000 or more; speciﬁcation 1d, 3d, and 5d only include tax clienteles A and C.
The variables are deﬁned as in Table 5. Standard errors based on a pairwise bootstrap (500 replications) accounting for
conditional heteroskedasticity and serial correlation are reported in parentheses. The adjusted R-squares in the regressions
are reported in %. N is the total number of observations available; N0 is the number of observations with zero dividend
yield expressed in % of total number of observations.
28Table 7: Dividend Yield and Tax Preferences in a Tobit Model
1e 2e 3e 4e 5e
2001 dummy 3.037 5.761 5.321 4.588 4.688
(0.026) (0.043) (0.059) (0.109) (0.144)
2002 dummy 2.012 4.659 4.236 3.487 3.603
(0.027) (0.032) (0.050) (0.106) (0.140)
2003 dummy 2.483 5.103 4.673 3.933 4.041
(0.026) (0.030) (0.047) (0.106) (0.136)
2004 dummy 2.336 4.877 4.452 3.706 3.821
(0.028) (0.031) (0.051) (0.105) (0.137)
2005 dummy 3.410 6.072 5.632 4.900 5.000
(0.025) (0.040) (0.059) (0.108) (0.141)
B. Businesses –1.712 –0.084 0.004
(0.027) (0.025) (0.026)
C. Investment funds –0.256 –0.824 –0.699
(0.041) (0.044) (0.042)
Tax preference θ 1.234 0.700
(0.117) (0.148)
Beta (Market) –0.711 –0.423 –0.715 –0.426
(0.021) (0.032) (0.022) (0.037)
Beta (HML) 1.417 1.412
(0.015) (0.015)
Beta (SMB) 0.525 0.525
(0.030) (0.032)
Idiosyncratic risk –0.088 –0.087 –0.087 –0.086
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Pseudo R2 4.1 45.4 47.7 45.4 47.6
N 164,743 164,743 164,743 164,743 164,743
N0 29.9 29.9 29.9 29.9 29.9
E(Yit|B, ¯ Xit) − E(Yit|A, ¯ Xit) –1.426 –0.082 0.004 –0.179 –0.102
(0.025) (0.024) (0.025) (0.017) (0.022)
E(Yit|C, ¯ Xit) − E(Yit|A, ¯ Xit) –0.230 –0.780 –0.667 –0.357 –0.204
(0.037) (0.040) (0.040) (0.034) (0 043)
The table presents the results of a pooled Tobit model where the dividend yield is regressed on
portfolio characteristics over 2001–2005. The variables are deﬁned as in Table 5. Standard errors
based on a pairwise bootstrap (500 replications) accounting for conditional heteroskedasticity and
serial correlation are reported in parenthesis. The pseudo R-square is the squared correlation
between predicted and observed dividend yields and is reported in %. N is the total number of
observations available; N0 is the number of observations with zero dividend yield expressed in % of
total number of observations. The lower part of the table presents how the expected dividend yield
on portfolios held by tax-exempt investors (clientele A) diﬀers from the yields on other portfolios.
The expected yields are calculated conditional on the typical characteristics of portfolios held
by tax-exempt investors. Standard errors, calculated from the bootstrapped variance-covariance























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































30Table 9: Market Value of Stock Portfolio Relative to Book Value of Assets
0-25% 26-50% 51-75% 76-100% ≥ 101% Sum
Non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms 19,294 4,010 1,841 916 695 26,756
[72.1] [15.0] [6.9] [3.4] [2.6] [100.0]
Assets < SEK 2 million 7,719 2,311 1,100 602 486 12,218
[63.2] [18.9] [9.0] [4.9] [4.0] [100.0]
Assets ≥ SEK 2 million 11,575 1,699 741 314 209 14,538
[79.6] [11.7] [5.1] [2.2] [1.4] [100.0]
Financial ﬁrms 626 389 237 144 144 1,540
[40.6] [25.3] [15.4] [9.4] [9.4] [100.0]
The table presents the number of observations of the ratio of the market value of the stock portfolio to the book
value of total assets. The frequencies of the observations (in %) are given in square brackets. Non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms are
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